This paper presents results of a survey of national legislation and strategies to mitigate climate change from 2007 to 2012 covering almost all United Nations member states. This dataset is distinguished from the existing literature in its breadth of coverage, its focus on national policies rather than international pledges, and on the use of objective metrics rather than normative criteria. To accomplish this, the data is also limited to national climate legislation and strategies and does not cover sub-national or sectoral measures. Climate legislation and strategies are important because they can: enhance incentives for climate mitigation, provide mechanisms for mainstreaming; and provide a focal point for actors.
Introduction 1
The debate on the architecture of a future global climate agreement has been complemented in recent years by growing empirical attention to the shifting policy context within national jurisdictions. The comparative politics literature, for example, explores why national governments have implemented a variety of national policies aimed at climate protection (Harrison & Sundstrom, 2007; Held, Roger, & Nag, 2013; Bailey & Compston, 2012; Compston & Bailey, 2008; Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010) and the shared objectives and concepts that define them (Hollo, Kulovesi, & Mehling, 2013) . Country studies examine specific instances of experimentation with national climate policy,for example, Sugiyama and Takeuchi(2008) for Japan, Tsang and Kolk (2010) for China, Atteridge, Shrivastava, Pahuja & Upadhyay (2012) for India, La Rovere (2011) for Brazil, Rabe(2011) for the US, Wurzel and Connelly (2010) for the EU and Weidner and Mez (2008) for Germany. Other bodies of literature seek to compare these efforts across countries in order to draw a composite global picture of emergent climate policy at the national level. Without prejudice to ongoing debates over the relative merits of "top-down" versus "bottom-up" approaches to climate policy (Winkler et al. 2008; Dubash & Rajamani, 2010; Hare, Stockwell, Flachsland, & Oberthür, 2010; Rayner, 2010; Schreurs, 2008; Streck, 2012) , the apparent proliferation of national level policies and actions around climate change appears deserving of further study and attention. This paper seeks to add to the emergent literature on whether and how transitions to a low carbon economy are possible in different national contexts, by systematically documenting the extent of nationally binding climate legislation and non-binding climate strategies that have been put in place in recent years, specifically from 2007 to 2012. The particular focus of attention is on national mitigation legislation and strategy rather than sub-national or sectoral approaches. This work is based on a dataset compiled predominantly from government sources, in order to characterize and analyze the range of national climate action. This dataset enables examination of the spread of different forms of climate action, which is presented in a variety of ways, in order to draw conclusions about the spread of climate policy at the national level and its implications.
This dataset is distinguished from other sources by its breadth of coverage. Instead of an in-depth analysis of a select few countries this paper aims to provide an overview of national level climate policy in almost all UN member states. In addition, instead of reporting on country pledges within the UNFCCC process, as many studies do, the emphasis here is on national policy processes, which are explicitly categorized in two discrete categories. The intention is to focus not on what countries say they will do in the international process, but instead to turn the spotlight on what they are actually doing within their national borders.
Section 1 locates this paper in the context of other, similar projects and explains the commonalities and differences. Section 2 makes the case for why attention to climate laws and strategies are a salient metric to track, and explains how the approach followed here is different from and complements other tracking studies. Section 3 lays out the methodology. The results are presented in Section 4, and discussed in Section 5, which also concludes.
Survey of Studies to Track National Climate Policy
As national climate policy has proliferated, so have the range of efforts to track these policies. Doing so, however, is a daunting task for a variety of reasons. First, data is entirely decentralized by country, making the task of compiling an extensive database challenging. Second, since climate policy is a relatively recent field and is undergoing a phase of experimentation, there are a wide range of approaches and policies currently being attempted -including policies that may not be defined as climate policies but have an effect on climate outcomes --which raise definitional issues and questions of comparability across countries. Third, measuring actual effectiveness of policies raises an additional set of challenges, frequently requiring in-country analysis and raising the bar for effective cross country comparison. All three challenges need to be met, but, in practice, it is extremely difficult to meet them all in any one particular database.
Multiple efforts have been undertaken, each of which brings a particular focus, as summarized in Table 1 . The last column "Climate Change Mitigation Strategy Survey" provides a summary of the attempt in this paper to address the challenge identified above. (Höhne, Braun, et al., 2012) • Note: These two studies refer to the CAT country studies, as distinct to the CAT analysis of international GHG reduction pledges, which cover a larger number of countries.
As Table 1 indicates, some studies emphasize wide country coverage, while others choose a broad scope but for a smaller set of countries. Most of the existing studies cover only a sub-set of countries, in many cases based on the justification that a large proportion of global emissions are covered by scrutinizing a relatively small number of countries.
Studies also differ in whether they assess stringency of policies or benchmark the country strategies against global targets. Efforts to undertake these qualitative judgements allow authors of these studies to produce scorings and rankings across countries. However, these invariably involve a measure of subjective judgement, to different extents. For example, the GLOBE study only compares countries to their own past performance, while other studies make qualitative judgements on the appropriateness of policies, as judged against a range of benchmarks. Two studies rate countries on the likelihood of meeting their self-selected targets (DB: Global Climate Change Policy Tracker and Greenhouse gas emission reduction proposals and national climate policies of major economies). Two other studies use the overall objective of the UNFCCC to prevent dangerous climate change and break itdown to country level using a constructed index (Germanwatch Climate Change Performance Index)or a generic best practice policy package (Climate Action Tracker country assessment).
Rationale and Approach
The "National Climate Change Mitigation Legislation and Strategy Survey" discussed here is distinguished from the existing literature in three important ways.
▪ First, the survey categorizes climate policy based on a relatively few criteria that can be objectively assessed. The intention is to stay clear of normative efforts to judge adequacy. ▪ Second, the focus is explicitly on national policies expressed in terms of mitigating climate change, and not on energy, forestry or other sector-specific policies that have the effect of climate mitigation, unless they are explicitly linked to climate mitigation objectives. For example, renewable energy promotion policies in isolation are not included. Moreover, sub-national policies are also out of the purview of this study. ▪ Third, the survey includes nearly all countries in the UN system, because of the priorities above. This avoids biases introduced through partial sampling.
The result is a database that minimizes normative judgement, explicitly focuses on dedicated efforts to tackle climate change mitigation at the national level and provides very large coverage. Assessing the existence of climate legislation and/or policy (even without an assessment of its stringency or of sub-national actions) is important for at least three reasons. These are all hard to measure, but can nonetheless be significant.
Enhance direct incentives for mitigation:
The conventional argument for climate legislation or policy is that it may be a necessary, even if not sufficient, condition for the introduction of new policies and instruments that shape the incentives for economic actors in favour of actions that limit greenhouse gas emissions. This remains an important argument for some countries, but this logic need not apply in all cases. For example, there may be shifts in energy policy for non-climate reasons, such as energy security or articulated in non-climate terms where political acceptance for explicit climate policy is very low. Nonetheless, climate policy at the national level may be important for other reasons as discussed below.
2. Mechanisms for mainstreaming. Explicit articulation of climate legislation and policies can amplify and enhance sectoral policies that have the effect of climate mitigation by providing a framework and a structure for integrating and incentivizing other relevant policy arenas -energy, transport, urban planning -to address climate change. In other words, mainstreaming climate change as a policy objective is likely to be enabled by overarching climate policy, beyond what disconnected sectoral policies can accomplish in isolation. Well-framed national policies can provide mechanisms to induce sectoral policy-makers to consider mainstreaming climate change into sectoral policies.
Focal point for bureaucracies, NGOs and the private sector.
Climate change laws and policies do not operate only through direct incentives, they have a number of indirect effects. These include creating integrating institutions, changing incentive structures for bureaucracies, generating new sources of data and metrics that affect bureaucratic functioning, generating political opportunities, providing signals to the private sector, providing "hooks" around which civil society can organize and mobilize, and inducing normative shifts in favour of effective mitigation action.
It is important to appropriately understand both the limits and the contributions of this work. This paper is limited to analysis of national climate legislation and strategy. This is not to claim that climate mitigation can only happen in the presence of national climate policy -whether binding or non-binding. For example, there can be substantial policy innovation at the sub-national, including municipal, level in the absence of a national framework, as also at the sectoral level. Even more broadly, the paper is limited to mitigation and does not cover adaptation and resilience. This focus on mitigation is not intended to signal a primacy of mitigation concerns over adaptation; indeed in many small vulnerable countries adaptation should likely be the focus.
Keeping these caveats in mind, this paper nonetheless argues that there is a great deal to be learnt from compiling and analysing a database of national climate change legislation and strategies, as discussed above. This survey covers one part of the story related to these mechanisms and is intended as a complement to and not a substitute for other studies that directly examine stringency of national effort, benchmark these against global targets, or examine sub-national and co-benefits based actions, and adaptation policies. In sum, the circumscribed purpose of the database discussed here is to fill in a gap in the existing literature --to provide comprehensive coverage of national legislation and strategy that can, potentially, lead to economy-wide incentives, mechanisms for mainstreaming climate change mitigation, and a focal point for normative and institutional change.
Methodology
The objectives sought by the methodology described here are: ease of application; transparency; consistency; and ease of comprehension. To achieve these objectives, all countries are scored on a three level grading using the criteria in Table 2 below. The highest category (1) is applied to cases where there is parliament-approved national legislation (Act of Parliament or an equivalent process for non-parliamentary states) explicitly aimed at greenhouse gas limitation or reduction. We allow for systems where the same effect is achieved by multiple acts covering all relevant sectors; a unitary climate law is not required. This category is distinguished from category (2) by the presence or absence of parliamentary approval, which implies domestic legal bindingness. National plans, strategies and frameworks that are not approved by a parliament fall in category (2). In order to separate out this category from broad declarations of intent that have no actual effect on government functioning, we require that category (2) approaches include the existence of a coordinating body charged with developing and implementing further action. While a coordinating body is not a guarantee of further action, the existence of such a body is at minimum an indication of intent, which is empirically measureable. For category (1) we do not check if such a body exists. Countries that did not meet either requirement are categorized as category (3), while those for which data was unavailable were marked as category (4).
The implications of distinguishing between (1) Climate Legislation and (2) Climate Strategy and Coordinating Body are worth exploring further. National legislation is binding on national governments, typically harder to reverse than climate strategies or policies across successive governments, and provides avenues for accountability through judicial processes. Whether these differences between legislation and strategy translate into differential force for the three mechanisms we describe above -enhanced incentives, mechanisms for mainstreaming, and focal point for action -is an empirical question that is flagged in the conclusion. In addition, the interpretation of climate legislation versus strategy depends on national political cultures -the act of legislating may have considerable force in one political culture and less in another. Despite these caveats, this study distinguishes between the two categories because it is likely that the tendency is for legislation to signal greater political commitment and greater impetus to action, and because separating the categories is likely to make this survey more useful as a platform for future empirical work. To implement this approach, official government websites were analyzed wherever possible to assess national legislation and policies using these categories. Supplementary information contained in the National Communications to the UNFCCC or information available on the UN agency websites was used to cross check government sources. Exceptions have been made in cases where the government documents were available on some non-government websites. These categories were applied for two points in time, 2 The complete data on the basis of which the analysis below is presented, including categorization, basis for categorization and sources is attached as a separate Appendix.
In order to relate the findings to population and emission trends, data was drawn from the EDGAR database. All data represented here are for all greenhouse gases, all sectors (including agriculture and forestry), using 100-year global warming potentials of the Second Assessment Report of the IPCC. The survey covers 193 countries, out of which coding was successfully accomplished for 180 countries, which represent 97% of global population and 97% of GHG emissions in 2010. Figure 2 show that the number of countries that have either climate legislation or climate strategy has increased significantly since 2007. By 2012, 39% of the countries studied fell in one of these categories, while in 2007 only 23% did so. There has been a slight increase in the number of countries with national climate legislation (18% in 2007 to 21% in 2012), and a larger increase in the number of countries with climate strategies (5% in 2007 and 18% in 2012) . Figure 2 shows that there are also significant regional effects. Additionally many countries from Latin America, Asia and Economies in Transition have adopted climate strategies over this period. The trend is particularly pronounced when the data are reported in terms of population covered. While the share of the world's population covered by a legislation or strategy doubled between 2007 and 2012 from 36% to 73%, it increased even more significantly from 43% to 97% for Asia (Figure 2b ). Looking at the number of countries rather than population, 59% of countries in Asia have either legislation or strategies in 2012 (Figure 2a ). This indicates that larger, more populous countries, i.e. in the case of Asia mainly India and China, are more likely to have put in place climate legislation or strategies. This is perhaps explained by the likelihood that larger, more populous countries have experienced greater global pressure to introduce climate mitigation strategies. 
Results
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3 137 (71%) 106 (55%) 3 114 (86%) 85 (64%) 23 (39%) 21 (36%) 3 28 (85%) 22 (67%) 57 (86%) 51 (77%) 29 (85%) 12 (35%) 17 (57%) 16 (53%) 6 (21%) 5 (17%) 4 11 (6%) 11 (6%) 4 10 (8%) 10 (8%) Figure 3and Figure 4 illustrate the extent to which current shares of greenhouse gas emissions are covered by national climate legislation or strategy. In this map, the area of a country is represented in proportion to its current GHG emissions. Since data are not available for 2012 emission levels, we use 2010 emission levels for both maps (2007 and 2012) . We find that by 2012, a significant and noteworthy share of emissions, i.e. 67% of global emissions, are covered by climate legislation or strategies, while the equivalent figure was 45% in 2007.In particular the share of emissions under legislation jumped from 15% to 44%, with several countries adopting legislation, such as Australia, Brazil, China, Mexico and South Korea. Notably, Canada, which had a legally binding emissions strategy in 2007, reverted to having no future strategy in place by 2012. The regional trends apparent from Figures 1 and 2 are further reinforced when the data is reported in terms of proportion of emissions covered. Figure 3 shows that the biggest shift in emission coverage between 2007 and 2012 is in the developing world, with emissions from Asia and Latin America in particular coming within the ambit of climate legislation or strategy. In Africa, the number of countries without a climate legislation or climate strategy is high, but their share of emissions, even in aggregate, is low. Taken as a block, by 2012 49% of current emissions from the developing world regions are under climate law and 77% of emissions are under either law or strategy (Figure 4) . The equivalent numbers for the developed world regions are 38% and 54% respectively. 3 Cumulative emissions are often regarded as a relevant indicator for estimating the historical responsibility of countries to act on climate change (BASIC experts, 2011) . Here the patterns are similar to the current emissions data but the differences are more pronounced. Figure 6 illustrates that by 2012, countries from which 40% of cumulative emissions have been sourced are covered by climate law and 60% by climate law or strategies, while the equivalent figures were only 23% and 41% in 2007. 
Conclusions
This paper presents results of a survey of the development of national climate legislation and strategies from 2007 to 2012 covering almost all UN member states. The authors surveyed the existence of nationally binding climate legislation or non-binding climate strategies with a supporting coordinating body for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions without directly assessing their stringency or effect, and without examining sub-national action. A focus on just national climate legislation or policy is worth studying because it can lead to efforts to increase incentives for climate mitigation, serve as a basis for mainstreaming climate objectives into policy-making, and become a focal point for the actions of bureaucrats, NGOs and the private sector, including through shaping norms.
The results of the analysis suggest three broad conclusions. First, there is a significant global trend between 2007 and 2012 toward more climate legislation and strategies. This result is robust, whether the results are sliced by number of countries (23% to 39%), population (36% to 73%), or emissions (45% to 67%).
Second, there is a strong regional effect to the changes, with many of the new developments occurring in the developing world. A substantial proportion of OECD (1990) countries began the period with laws (72%) or strategies (7%) and this inched up only marginally, with laws remaining the same and strategies increasing to 10%. In Asia, the number of countries with legislation increased from 0 to 9% and with strategies from 9% to 50% between 2007 and 2012. In Latin America, the equivalent figures are 3% to 15% (legislation) and 12% to 18% (strategies). The impact is particularly pronounced in emission terms. By 2012, 62% of Asian emissions were under climate law and 34% under strategies, and in Latin America the comparable figures were 63% and 13%. In fact, by 2012 these numbers were larger than for OECD (1990) countries, where 44% of emissions were covered by law and 3% by strategy. Taken collectively 49% of current emissions from the developing world regions are under climate law and 28% of emissions are under strategy while the equivalent numbers for the developed world regions are 38% and 16%.
Third, many more countries are adopting a non-binding climate strategy approach than a nationally binding climate legislation approach. The proportion of countries with legislation increased marginally from 18% to 21%, while the number of countries with strategies increased substantially from 5% to 18%. Notably, due to the dominant effect of new legislation by large countries including China during this period, this trend is not observed when the data is sorted by population (10% to 36% increase in legislation and 26% to 37% increase in strategies) or emissions (15% to 44% increase in legislation and 30% to 23% decrease in strategies).
A few different implications may be drawn from these findings, with relevance for future research. To begin with, the 2007-2012 period, encompassing the Copenhagen Conference of Parties in 2009, was one of heightened international debate and negotiation. While no comparable database exists for any other period, the substantial increase in climate legislation and strategies over this period suggests that the international negotiating process may have exerted some influence, even if indirect. As future data becomes available, it will be important to understand the linkages between climate negotiations and national climate legislation and strategy.
Additionally, given that climate policy is developing at a variety of levels (national and sub-national) and through a variety of ways (climate-focus and sectoral focus), it would be useful to more explicitly examine the relevance of the three mechanisms we propose here through which national laws and strategies operate -creation of incentives, mechanisms for mainstreaming and focal points for actors. Given the growing prevalence of climate strategies rather than laws in many countries, the extent to which these mechanisms differ in the context of laws versus strategies is particularly worth exploring.
